SCANDAL CHRONOLOGY

IZVESTIYA CHRONICLES EVENTS OF 19-20 JUNE. On 21 June, Izvestiya published a chronology of the events triggered by the detention of Yeltsin campaign aides Sergei Lisovskii and Arkadii Yevstafev. The two aides were detained by men identifying themselves as agents of the Presidential Security Service (SBP) as they were leaving the government building (White House) at 5 p.m. on 19 June. They were then taken to a room in that building and interrogated until about 3 a.m. Both men said the questions concerned the election campaign, and focused on the role of former Deputy Prime Minister Anatolii Chubais. According to early reports, the two men had been stopped because they had been carrying a box allegedly holding $500,000. Lisovskii subsequently denied this report, and asserted that the money was planted by the SBP agents who detained him. At some point, the two men apparently used their cellular phones to alert their colleagues to their plight. At about midnight, the Yeltsin campaign headquarters sent a fax to ITAR-TASS saying that the two aides had been arrested, and at about the same time NTV announced that it would soon begin broadcasts on an important election-related story.

NTV and ORT were put on alert to interview newly-appointed Security Council Secretary Aleksandr Lebed about the incident, Izvestiya reported, by phone calls from the Moscow headquarters of the LogoVAZ company, where its head Boris Berezovskii was meeting with MOST group chairman Vladimir Gusinskii and NTV president Igor Malashenko. All three businessmen are political opponents of Korzhakov and Barsukov, while Berezovskii and Gusinskii hold significant interests in NTV and ORT, respectively. These two networks’ special reports on the incident through the night lent it a sensational character. News crews were dispatched, and they interviewed Lebed at 4:20 a.m., after the two aides had already been released. He assessed the incident as an attempt to disrupt the upcoming runoff election, and promised that any “mutiny” would be ruthlessly suppressed. While he refused to name those involved, he said he would investigate it thoroughly, and recommend to President Yeltsin that those who are guilty be punished. ITAR-TASS did not report the story until 8 a.m.

At Yeltsin’s campaign headquarters later that morning, staffers told Izvestiya that Lebed had visited in the early morning for a meeting with Yeltsin’s first aide Viktor Ilyushin, known as a rival of Korzhakov and Barsukov. Meanwhile, Korzhakov and Barsukov began to defend their actions, declaring that their men had merely detained the two aides because of the suspicious hard currency. Barsukov told ITAR-TASS that “any attempt to give the incident a political character is an absolute provocation.” However, Yeltsin campaign head Sergei Filatov, also a long-time rival of Korzhakov, told journalists that the incident was an attempt by Korzhakov and Barsukov to force the cancellation of the runoff election, and accused them of meddling in President Yeltsin’s campaign against his instructions. Curiously, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin told ITAR-TASS the same morning that the incident was “over,” attributing it to delays in checking that the two aides actually had permission to remove the hard currency from the White House. However, this explanation does not correspond with the aides’ subsequent claims that the money was planted on them.

At a scheduled meeting of the Russian Security Council at 10 a.m. that morning, Lebed was presented to his new colleagues. Official reports of the meeting do not say whether the incident was discussed, although Barsukov was present at the meeting. After the session, Yeltsin met with Chubais at noon. Only after these two meetings was it announced at 12:45 p.m. that Yeltsin had sacked Korzhakov, Barsukov, and also First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, their close ally. While tying up some of the links in the story, the Izvestiya chronology still leaves many unanswered questions. Did the two aides have a box full of foreign currency or not? Why were these two arrested? These questions are sure to grease the wheels of the Moscow rumor mill for the next several weeks. -- Scott Parrish

CANDIDATES AND PARTIES

YAVLINSKII STILL WITHHOLDS YELTSIN ENDORSEMENT. Yabloko leader Grigorii Yavlinskii said that he was pleased by Yeltsin’s recent removal of several key hardliners from his inner circle. However, Yavlinskii refused to endorse the president’s bid for a second term on 3 July until he knows who will replace the fallen leaders. He said that “everything now depends on appointments, not dismissals,” Reuters reported on 21 June. -- Robert Orttung

COMMUNISTS QUESTION FINAL FIGURES. The Duma has sent a request to the Central Electoral Commission, asking it to clarify the number of voters in the country and what the actual turnout was, ITAR-TASS reported on 21 June. Duma Security Committee Chairman Viktor Ilyukhin initiated the request. The final figures list 108,494,533 voters in Russia. There were only 107,496,558 voters in the December Duma election and the source of the additional million is unclear. -- Robert Orttung

DUMA DEPUTIES SEEK TO CREATE A NON-COMMUNIST FACTION. Sergei Belyaev, the head of the Our Home Is Russia faction, is spearheading an effort to create a non-communist faction within the State Duma to counter the Communists’ current dominance of parliament, Izvestiya reported on 20 June. Belyaev said that the idea surfaced two months ago, but intensive work on building the coalition began only after the first round of the presidential election on 16 June. The alliance would bring together deputies from Our Home Is Russia, Yabloko, Russian Regions, Russia’s Democratic Choice, and independents. The new faction would be called “Parliamentary Accord,” Moskovskii komsomolets reported on 21 June. Members of the Democratic Party of Russia are split between working with the Communists or the anti-communists. Zyuganov has promised Democratic Party leader Sergei Glazev a high position in a possible Communist-led government of national trust, although the party campaigned for Lebed during the first round of the presidential election. Lebed apparently has not been in contact with Glazev since taking on his new positions in the Yeltsin administration. Observers doubt Yavlinskii’s willingness to participate in such a bloc. -- Robert Orttung

MINOR CANDIDATES ON THE SECOND ROUND. Pharmaceuticals magnate Vladimir Bryntsalov on 17 June affirmed that he is “now very confident of Yeltsin’s victory” which he would “of course support,” while Martin Shakkum and Mikhail Gorbachev appeared more doubtful. Shakkum refused to predict who would win the second round: “I am not sure of Yeltsin’s victory,” he stressed. “Anyway, my own vote will not influence the general results,” he concluded. Mikhail Gorbachev praised the fact that this election “did take place and was peaceful,” and repeatedly said that he would appeal to people to vote against both candidates. -- Anne Nivat in Moscow

MEDIA

YELTSIN CAMPAIGN DISTRIBUTES ANTI-COMMUNIST VIDEO. Among the campaign materials distributed to pro-Yeltsin activists across the country is an anti-communist documentary film meant to be shown at campaign events or informal gatherings. A copy of the film was obtained by OMRI at the Sverdlovsk Oblast Yeltsin campaign headquarters. Only brief glimpses of Yeltsin appear in the hour-long video; it is almost entirely devoted to recalling the millions of people who suffered under Communist rule. For instance, the viewer sees starving children during the famine of the early 1920s, people cheering alongside piles of burning icons, and churches being demolished. The video includes some extremely graphic footage of enemies being executed during the 1920s, recently uncovered bodies of Polish officers murdered in the Katyn forest in 1941, and Soviet soldiers who died in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The video also recalls the environmental devastation wrought by some Soviet projects, including the Chornobyl nuclear disaster and miles of desert once covered by the Aral Sea. Viewers are repeatedly reminded of the Civil War, Stalin’s purges, World War II, and the war in Afghanistan. The current war being waged in Chechnya is not mentioned. -- Laura Belin in Yekaterinburg

ANTI-COMMUNIST ENTERTAINMENT ON TV. During the final week of the campaign, Russia’s major TV networks aired programs reminding the public of crimes committed during the Soviet period. For instance, ORT broadcast a film about the murder of the tsar’s family, and NTV showed a two-part documentary about the activities of the secret police between 1917 and 1953. On the evening of 15 June, ORT broadcast Nikita Mikhalkov’s award-winning film Burnt by the Sun, which is set at the height of Stalin’s purges. Mikhalkov, who both starred in and directed the film, has openly campaigned for President Yeltsin’s re-election. -- Laura Belin in Moscow

GRISLY PRE-ELECTION “KUKLY.” The 15 June edition of NTV’s satirical puppet show “Kukly” explored the nightmares Central Electoral Commission (TsIK) Chairman Nikolai Ryabov might have had on the eve of the election. First Ryabov is visited by visions of Yeltsin and Zyuganov, warning him to count the vote correctly. Then he discovers the body of Yavlinskii next to a note blaming the TsIK, Aleksandr Lebed’s head in his refrigerator, and Zhirinovsky with a knife in his back. As ghosts of the angry dead candidates close in on him, Ryabov wakes up screaming. He makes himself tea and goes back to sleep, but his nightmares return. In the closing moments of the program, visions of all the major candidates stand over Ryabov’s bed discussing possible falsification. Yeltsin’s top bodyguard Aleksandr Korzhakov remarks menacingly that a “great responsibility” now lies with the TsIK, and Ryabov cries out for help. -- Laura Belin in Moscow

VIEW FROM YEKATERINBURG

HOW ONE GOVERNOR HELPED YELTSIN’S CAMPAIGN. President Yeltsin was expected to post a strong showing in Sverdlovsk Oblast, his native region, but the 59.5% of the vote he captured exceeded even optimistic projections, especially since Aleksandr Lebed took second place with 14.2%, and Gennadii Zyuganov gained only 11.7%. In addition to being the favorite son, Yeltsin was helped substantially by Sverdlovsk Governor Eduard Rossel. Yeltsin removed Rossel from office in 1993, but he allowed Sverdlovsk to hold a gubernatorial election in August 1995, which Rossel won. Since then, the two have found a common language. In January, Sverdlovsk became the first oblast to sign a power-sharing agreement with the federal authorities. (Yeltsin has since signed several similar agreements on the campaign trail.) Rossel and his supporters contributed both financial and human resources to Yeltsin’s campaign. In May and June, Sverdlovsk Oblast authorities reportedly helped pay overdue wages to many residents; solving the wage arrears problem was one of Yeltsin’s key campaign promises. In addition, most of the largely pro-Rossel regional media strongly supported Yeltsin. Antonina Lazareva, who supervised oblast-wide organizational work for Yeltsin’s Sverdlovsk headquarters, told OMRI on 18 June that Yeltsin’s campaign infrastructure consisted of about 80 branches scattered across the region. Only about 10 of those were started from scratch for the presidential campaign. The rest were first set up as branches for Rossel’s movement Transformation of the Urals, which contested the April legislative election in Sverdlovsk and won about 35% of the vote, far more than any other party. -- Laura Belin in Yekaterinburg

DEMORALIZED COMMUNISTS REGROUP. About 50 activists from both the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) and the more extreme Russian Communist Workers’ Party (RKRP) discussed how to improve their campaign strategy at a meeting in Yekaterinburg on 20 June. Zyuganov’s third-place finish in Sverdlovsk Oblast with less than 12% of the vote was considered humiliating. (The KPRF won only about 8% of the regional vote in the December 1995 parliamentary election.) Several activists expressed frustration, having encountered people living in absolute poverty or struggling to get by on a pension who nonetheless were voting for Yeltsin. Yurii Vazhenin, the KPRF representative who chaired the meeting, reminded the group that since the mass media was largely stacked in Yeltsin’s favor, it was all the more important to “go to the people” and agitate on behalf of Gennadii Zyuganov. Acknowledging that campaigning in a city where Yeltsin is a “popular hero” would be an uphill battle, he nonetheless urged them not to give up on Yekaterinburg itself, where Yeltsin gained about 70% support on 16 June and Zyuganov less than 8%. By way of encouragement, Vazhenin reminded his colleagues of localities in the oblast where Zyuganov won up to a third of the vote. The activists shared what they considered the most effective techniques for persuading friends and strangers. For instance, a woman remarked that whenever people said they could not vote for Zyuganov because of the Stalin-era repression or collectivization, she responded that Zyuganov was not even born during the 1930s. Furthermore, Zyuganov did not shell the parliament in 1993 and did not start the war in Chechnya. -- Laura Belin in Yekaterinburg

DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW WITHIN THE LEBED CAMP. . . The news that Aleksandr Lebed had agreed to serve as Security Council secretary and Yeltsin’s special adviser on national security issues was greeted with both enthusiasm and dismay among his supporters. Aleksandr Levchenko, head of Lebed’s campaign operation in Sverdlovsk Oblast, told OMRI on 20 June that Lebed made the right decision, and at least 70% of those who voted for him on 16 June will back Yeltsin in the second round. However, Levchenko was interrupted by an angry campaign worker who argued that Lebed’s backers know nothing will change for the better as long as Yeltsin remains president, and they consequently feel betrayed. When Levchenko countered that only a minority of Lebed voters held such views, the disappointed campaign worker shouted, “You weren’t here yesterday when the people were calling.” Another campaign worker apologized for his colleague’s emotional outburst but admitted that “We are offended” by Lebed’s move. Both Levchenko and Leonid Khabanov, a campaign representative authorized to speak on behalf of Lebed in Sverdlovsk, were careful to point out that during the next two weeks they will not campaign “for Yeltsin.” Rather, they will try to convince Lebed’s electorate that voting for Yeltsin is now the best way to support Lebed’s program. -- Laura Belin in Yekaterinburg

. . . AS BOTH SIDES AIM FOR LEBED SUPPORTERS. Activists from both the Yeltsin and Zyuganov headquarters in Sverdlovsk Oblast have expressed confidence that they will gain most of the votes from those who backed Lebed in the first round. Communist activists are convinced that Lebed was supported mostly by those who despise Yeltsin and the lawlessness in the country, and consequently would otherwise have voted for Zyuganov. They plan to appeal to Lebed’s electorate by telling them their leader “betrayed them” and “sold himself” to join the presidential administration. They will argue that Lebed struck a deal with the authorities before the first round but concealed his plans from his supporters. (During the last two weeks of the campaign, as Lebed began to appear more frequently on national television networks, Lebed posters and advertisements suddenly became much more visible in Yekaterinburg.) By contrast, Yeltsin campaign staff were convinced that the vast majority of the Lebed voters believe in their leader and will follow him, particularly since it is clear, following Yeltsin’s dismissal of four key hardliners, that his new position entails real authority. -- Laura Belin in Yekaterinburg

ANALYSIS AND PREDICTIONS

BARSUKOV, KORZHAKOV WANTED TO REPLACE CHERNOMYRDIN WITH SOSKOVETS. Federal Security Service chief Mikhail Barsukov and Presidential Security Service head Aleksandr Korzhakov decided to arrest two of Yeltsin’s campaign aides with the huge sum of foreign currency as part of a plan to replace Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin with First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, according to ITAR-TASS commentator Tamara Zamyatina on 20 June. The hardliners had been seeking Chernomyrdin’s spot since the beginning of the campaign when they succeeded in naming Soskovets to lead Yeltsin’s campaign effort. Soskovets’s failure to handle the job, however, allowed presidential first aide Viktor Ilyushin and Chernomyrdin to replace him in March. Because the president trusted Korzhakov and Barsukov, he appointed them to the council that ran his campaign. They used this position to continue interfering in the re-election effort, coming into conflict with more liberal campaign advisers, Sergei Filatov, Georgii Satarov, and Anatolii Chubais. The final straw was that they feared that Lebed would side with the liberals and undermine their position and decided to go for broke. Yeltsin finally ran out of patience with the intrigues of the generals and decided to dismiss them, Zamyatina claimed. She argued that overall the scandal will not help the president’s campaign. However, it will allow the liberal intellectuals and the independent press to vote for the president without the fear of an authoritarian crackdown launched by his hardline advisers. -- Robert Orttung

POLLS BECOMING MORE ACCURATE. The major public opinion services did a good job of predicting the outcome of the first round of the presidential election, according to Kommersant-Daily on 18 June. All the major polling firms predicted that Yeltsin and Zyuganov would make it to the second round, and all showed Yeltsin ahead, except for Boris Grushin’s Vox Populi, which put them in a dead heat in predictions published on 12 June. Nugzar Betaneli’s Institute for the Sociology of Parliamentary democracy (ISP) overshot Yeltsin’s final result by predicting that he would win 40% of the vote rather than the 35% he received. The polls slightly underestimated Zyuganov’s support. The most difficult task was predicting the third place finisher. Betaneli’s ISP predicted that Yavlinskii would take third, Grushin leaned toward Yavlinskii and Zhirinovsky, while Aleksandr Oslon’s Public Opinion Foundation picked Zhirinovsky. Only VCIOM correctly chose Aleksandr Lebed. VCIOM was also closest to his final tally of nearly 15%, by marking him at 10%, while all the others were at least one point below that. Sociologists explain this failure by claiming that many of Lebed’s voters came over to his side during the last week, so his popularity was not picked up in their polls. Oslon, “the leading sociologist of the president’s campaign” argues that Lebed picked up most of his voters in this race from Yeltsin and Yavlinskii, while the approximately 4% that voted for his Congress of Russian Communities in the Duma election mostly came from Zhirinovsky. Oslon believes half of Lebed’s voters will back Yeltsin in the runoff, while the others will either vote for Zyuganov or stay home. The pollsters predicted more votes for Zhirinovsky than he received because in the last two elections they had underestimated his turnout and sought to compensate for those mistakes this time around. Zhirinovsky’s electorate is relatively unpredictable, but sociologists believe that what Zhirinovsky tells them to do will play a major role in how they vote. As many as 70% of Yavlinskii’s voters will support the president no matter what Yavlinskii does. The candidates themselves had the worst predictions. Yeltsin said that he would take more than 50% in the first round, while Zyuganov alleged that two-thirds of the voters were on his side. -- Robert Orttung

MILITARY VOTED FOR YELTSIN. To the extent that it is possible to judge the military vote, Russia’s soldiers supported their commander-in-chief, according to Segodnya on 18 June. Troops serving in Chechnya were the most pro-Yeltsin, with 82% supporting him. These soldiers liked Yeltsin’s promise to demobilize them after serving six months in a conflict zone. The paper’s data also shows that Lebed came in second place in the military. The Defense Ministry’s working group on the elections had expected Zyuganov to take second place. Lebed himself claimed that the Defense Ministry had falsified the military vote and that he had won 70% of it, although he rejected any attempts to do a recount. -- Robert Orttung

ELECTIONS MARK END OF COMMUNISM IN RUSSIA. The 16 June election marked the end of communism in Russia, Mikhail Leontev wrote in Segodnya on 18 June. He argued that the Communists demonstrated that their electorate could not expand beyond 30-35% even at the worst time for Yeltsin and when they had the strongest starting conditions. Following the election, an inevitable process of decomposition will begin in the Communist coalition and the resulting factions will have no chance to gain power, Leontev argued. -- Robert Orttung

TWO-PARTY SYSTEM FORMING IN RUSSIA. The contest between Yeltsin and Zyuganov is creating the basis for a two-party system in Russia, Andrei Papushin wrote in Rossiiskaya gazeta on 21 June. The new system would pit Our Home Is Russia (NDR) against a reformed Communist Party. The Communists may transform themselves into a social democratic party. Speakers at the recent closed Communist Party of the Russian Federation plenum, for example, stressed the need to change the party’s image by changing the party’s name and abandoning the Communist rhetoric that repels many people. Once the NDR forms itself as a party, it will have to work effectively to counter the reformed Communists, Papushin wrote. He argues that the new party of power should emphasize the “national-statist” idea. In this regard, the new NDR will find it advantageous to unite with the Congress of Russian Communities (also reformed) since then it will be able to steal votes from Vladimir Zhirinovsky who is “plowing the same field.” Papushin claimed that the idea of national-statism is likely to remain popular in the coming years. The other parties in Russia today will only be secondary factors to the two main political groups, Papushin argued. -- Robert Orttung

Compiled by Robert Orttung