Tribunal: Why have we seen such a slow start of the Tribunal? The number of detainees in The Hague is incomparably higher now than in your time. Is there a change and is it for real?

Richard Goldstone: The first year was really [spent on] establishing an institution that did not [previously] exist, and to do that within the United Nations system is time consuming. ... One had to be sure of getting as wide a geographic spread for the office as possible, so we were recruiting on four continents. Again, this was [an] expensive and time-consuming business. ... In the beginning, it was very difficult, because [we were in a] "chicken and egg" situation. We knew we would not get finances from either [national] governments or the UN if we did not show that we were in operating order. And to be in operating order you needed the funds. For that reason the first indictments were the quickest--not the best--indictments. We had to issue indictments in order to get the machine ticking. ... By the time we came to indict [then-Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan] Karadzic and [Ratko] Mladic, [Bosnian Croat general, Tihomir] Blaskic, and [former Croatian Serb leader Milan] Martic, we were operating more efficiently, with a much better-resourced investigation section, strategy section, [and] prosecution section, but then we hit the snag of arrests not being carried out. The big disappointment was that NATO was not prepared at any stage--again it was the question of the United States leadership--to risk injuries, let alone deaths, of [military] personnel in Bosnia. [It] was made publicly and privately clear--certainly to me at the Pentagon--that they weren't so concerned about the actual carrying out of the arrests but [about] the [potential] consequences of arrests--hostage taking, sniping, grenades, that sort of thing. ... The substantial [change in policy came only with the appointment] of Robin Cook and Madeleine Albright [as British foreign minister and U.S. secretary of state, respectively].

Tribunal: Did you feel that the argument about possible retaliation was a political excuse? Did NATO military really believe in it?

RG: It is difficult for me to judge. My own instinct was the other way. I just did not feel this was a serious consideration. But even if it was, it seemed to me that [it] is the sort of risk the people in uniform, who are well equipped and well armed, have to take. The attitude and the view I expressed during my meetings in Washington was that if they did not do it, then further down the road they may be putting their own troops at greater danger by leaving these people around to interfere with the peace process. ... Clearly, everybody I saw at that time wanted those who were indicted to be arrested. It did not require the change of principles. Policy is another matter. I agree--one sees continuation, one sees pressure building up. What made a huge difference was that Karadzic did not do what Mladic did--[he] did not disappear from the scene. He stayed there and remained a block for the implementation of the peace process. I think that was a fundamental aspect.

Tribunal: Can you recall any debates regarding the arrests of indicted war criminals that you had with any other representatives of the international community?

RG: I had only one important meeting with Carl Bildt. I was joined by Judge [Antonio] Cassese, then president of the Tribunal, and he and I were greatly disappointed with very cool reaction we got from Bildt [concerning] any role that he could play with regard to arrests. He regarded that this [as something out of] his area of consent, notwithstanding that we pointed out that the Dayton Agreement [had given] him and the head of the IFOR [the authority to] separately or jointly re-impose sanctions if any aspect of Dayton was not implemented. ... He said if we reapply sanctions, that is the end of Dayton. He was saying: "It's too big a weapon to be considered." And I was disappointed, [although] there was some substance to that. But at the same time, because of the size of the weapon, that could have been used as a credible threat. ... Klaus Kinkel was the most helpful of all in calling for the arrests. ... He was the only foreign minister before Cook and Albright who really spoke out. It was very noticeable that senior politicians in the other NATO governments really did not talk frequently about war criminals.

Tribunal: Have you ever felt any kind of direct or indirect political pressure from great powers?

RG: There was no political pressure either on me or anybody at the Tribunal. I've got no doubt. Any political pressure with regards to arrests clearly came from me--and the media. The media played a fundamentally important role. I've made no secret of the fact that I used whatever platform I could get in the media to build up as much pressure as possible in that direction. I think that made a big difference.

Tribunal: Media have, however, raised a concern and even entertained conspiracy theories as to why none of the supreme political leaders who started the Yugoslav war were indicted ...

RG: The only reason I can give is that there was not evidence that would have justified indictment. What is the position since I have left ... is another matter. But, certainly, the policy I adopted--and there was never a deviation from it--was that we gave preference to people higher up the political or military ladder. If there was evidence against anybody in a leading position, indictment would have followed automatically. I don't believe that any responsible prosecutor would be prepared to issue an indictment without evidence that is immediately available to be produced in court. There is no point in having hearsay stories for all sorts of people--no matter how reliable--if one cannot produce the evidence in court.

Tribunal: When did you come up with sealed indictments?

RG: Right from the beginning, there were sealed indictments. [Whenever] we thought that declamation of the names in public would make those people try to avoid arrest, indictments were kept sealed under the order of the judge who confirmed the indictment. The prosecutor has no authority to have a sealed indictment. In fact, the rules [specify] that the minute a judge confirms an indictment, it has to be made public, with the names--unless, on the motion of the prosecutor, the judge orders otherwise. But we did it in a number of cases. For instance, the Bosniaks that we indicted in the Celebici [camp] case, that was a sealed indictment, and it was only made public after the Bosnian government arrested two of them.

Tribunal: What was the procedure with the cases?

RG: The procedure we adopted in relation to indictments was that it was first produced by the investigation team, which had at least one lawyer working with it. Sometimes one of the senior crime attorneys--who would [eventually] take it to court--would be involved, but sometimes not. We were never sure whether it was a good idea or not. But after the investigation team prepared their "best indictment," it was always submitted to all of the lawyers in the prosecutor's office--other than prosecutor and deputy prosecutor. Graham Blewitt and I never got involved at the preparatory stage, because we felt we had to retain complete objectivity to do a complete review and not be involved in decisions and debates, take sides, and be influenced at all. All of the lawyers were furnished with complete documentation from the investigation team. They spent sometimes days and sometimes a couple of weeks meeting for hours a day--sometimes 20 to 25 people--debating each and every charge, whether it is justified on the evidence or not. ... There was often a heated debate. Only at the end of that process, the re-drafted indictment was given to me and Graham Blewitt. Frequently--with very few exceptions--we would refer back for more information, suggest some changes, and sometimes the whole meeting process was reinstated to deal with the problems we had. So it was quite a laborious business in which everybody was involved. But the final decision was mine, and sometimes the decision I took was a minority decision. It was not a democratic process but that of fully consulting with all in the office. It had two benefits. Firstly, one got the benefit of wide views of lawyers from many countries. Secondly, I think it was very important in imbuing a team spirit in the office--everybody felt involved. For that reason too, I held at least a monthly meeting for the whole staff--not only lawyers, everybody, the full office of 140 to 150 people, to fully brief them on even very confidential things.

Tribunal: Did you ever detect any information leak from your office?

RG: No. Not one.

Tribunal: Why is it that in some countries the Tribunal has been perceived as a politicized tool?

RG: It is an assumption that is made, and it is fueled by the media and political speculation. Whenever we issued an important indictment, people always connected the timing with external events. I was given amazing political ingenuity or criticism with regard to the timing. The best example was the second indictment against Karadzic and Mladic, which came out during the actual Dayton talks. Had we issued it before they had begun, we would have been accused of wanting to racket or influence it. If we had issued it afterward, we would have been accused of having held it back so as not to shipwreck Dayton. The fact that we did during [the actual talks] was beset either to be Machiavellian or brilliant or both. What people did not understand ... [was that we couldn't have kept] this sort of indictment in stock. ... After I signed an indictment, it went to the trial judge with all the material filed, which that judge had to go through. And sometimes it took seven days and sometimes the judge took four weeks. The judge would often call me in and say: "I want more information, why this charge and not that charge." So it was really impossible to time with that sort of accuracy. The system did not allow for it.

Tribunal: Do you think that this year's events in Kosovo should be investigated by the Tribunal?

RG: Absolutely. There is no question about it. Any war crime should be investigated.

Tribunal: How did you feel when media brought interviews with indicted war criminals, publishing their full addresses, like in the case of Milan Martic, who lived in Banja Luka at the address very near to IFOR facilities?

RG: It was very frustrating for us but even more frustrating to the victims. Many victims told our investigators: "How is it that you have indicted people for doing terrible things to us and to our families, and here they are walking around and still working in the police force." Therein lies one of the problems with international tribunals. In a national situation, if there is a case being investigated against a perpetrator, the police can normally arrest the perpetrator while the investigation is going on. In our case, we had to complete the investigation and the judge has to confirm the indictment before the warrant for arrest went out. This is one of the disadvantages, and there is no way to avoid it. It is difficult to expect national governments to arrest people on the say-so of a prosecutor who is not even in the country.

Tribunal: Why do you think that the time is ripe to form a permanent international war crimes tribunal? Why do we need it?

RG: Apart from the moral imperative of arresting and bringing to account war criminals, I think it is important firstly as a deterrent. I have no doubt that if there were an efficient, active, and permanent court, it would in some cases--not in all cases. Some criminals will never be deterred no matter what prospects. ... But it would operate on the minds of any political or military leader in war situation--in civil war or international war--if there was a prospect and probability of having to account enforced by the international community. [Secondly], I think it is vitally important for establishing individual responsibility for crimes and avoiding collective responsibility being ascribed to people. It's inevitable [that] if [individuals] are not brought to account, then you get this collective guilt, which lays the foundation for further violence and further violations of human rights in future. And, politically, I think the time is ripe, because the international community is now willing for the first time ever to give serious consideration to [this concept].

Tribunal: There is a strong opposition, especially among American lawyers, to a permanent international war-crimes court that would have jurisdiction even over national governments ...

RG: It is more American politicians than lawyers. The Republicans in the Senate and, to an extent, the Clinton administration itself has got a very unfortunate policy with regard to the role they want the Security Council to play, which would inevitably have the result of politicizing the court. But I am in a way relieved that a very strong group has emerged that is opposing [the decisive role for the] Security Council. At least 45 nations are [presently demanding] a truly independent [international] court.

It will take time, but we will get there. [For example], the OAU [Organization of African Unity] heads of state are meeting in the beginning of July and voting on an African human rights court, along the lines of the European Court [for Human Rights]. Three or four years ago, this would not [have even made] it on the agenda because of the tremendous opposition.

Tribunal: Truth commission concept vis-a-vis criminal court?

RG: I think they serve similar purposes. The huge value of a truth commission is when you are dealing with violations on a scale that the world has seen in Rwanda, South Africa, or the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Iraq. When we are dealing with hundreds of thousands of victims as in Rwanda ... [where there were] probably hundreds of thousands of perpetrators, no criminal tribunal could ever hope to cope with that sort of numbers. That is why truth commissions are important. South Africa is a good example. We have had some important criminal trials, like the trial against ... one of many police and military officers in South Africa who were [responsible for] very serious violations of human rights. His trial took well over a year. In two and a half years, the truth commission [has covered] a period of 34 years of apartheid and human rights-violations. I don't know how many criminal trials would it take to cover that period and do it that way. So, it is this hugely wider focus that the truth commission has in comparison to criminal prosecution That is a huge advantage. Both [approaches] have the important benefits of recording the events. Criminal trials do it more thoroughly, and therefore more convincingly--perhaps--than a truth commission, but there is always a cost and a benefit. From a moral point of view, what is fundamentally important is that you cannot have a truth commission without the agreement of the victims. In South Africa, the truth commission was voted by our first democratic parliament, which represented the overwhelming majority of the victims who were black South Africans. I think in Bosnia, a truth commission--if it were credible and had a proper investigation capacity--could serve a very important purpose for the same reason. It would have a wide focus and could record more accurately the history which would show--I have no doubt--that there were violations on all sides. But the victims would have to want it. I don't believe that truth commissions can ever be imposed either ... by the perpetrators or even by the international community.

Tribunal: Can former Yugoslavia ever be ready for a truth commission?

RG: Yes. I think that it could well be ready right now. It would complement the international tribunal. ... In my personal view, if there is to be a truth commission in Bosnia, it should not be an amnesty conduit, it should not grant amnesty. It is a very tricky question as to when granting an amnesty is morally justifiable. I would hate to be pushed to define the situation. In South Africa it sticks in many people's throats--including mine--that people would come and confess to murder partly to walk away with amnesty in their pocket. Many victims have the gravest objections to it. Clearly, there is a line somewhere, and I've got no doubt that people guilty of crimes against humanity and people guilty of genocide should not be considered either by an internal or international body for amnesty.

Tribunal: With many mass graves still unopened and thousands still missing in Bosnia, many strongly oppose any notion of amnesty. Would you agree?

RG: Again, I think it depends very much on the attitude of the victims.

Tribunal: Can you foresee any debate on the need for some kind of a permanent truth commission?

RG: No. I understand the motivation of people who want to do it and build some infrastructure available to countries. I am against it on purely practical ground. There is no moral objection to it. I think in theory it is a good idea. But the circumstances vary so much and no [two] truth commissions are remotely similar. They depend so much on political, military, and economic grounds. The South African Truth Commission is the broadest-based truth commission so far and that is for number of reasons. Firstly--politically South Africa can afford it. The [Nelson] Mandela government has no military leader breathing down its neck as [its Chilean counterpart] had [General Augusto] Pinochet breathing down his neck in Chile saying, "If you want a truth commission--no names, no public hearings, only disappearances, no other human-rights violations." [That was not the case] in South Africa. Economically, South Africa could afford an expensive truth commission. ... Also, South Africans could do that themselves--no international personnel have been used and I think that is the strength of the Truth Commission. It is a huge advantage, because the people, the commissioners themselves, and the people they are working with are coming from all sectors of South African community--black, white, English, Afrikaners--they are all there. The victims also come from all sectors of the communities which played important role in avoiding a collective guilt being ascribed to anybody for the crimes of apartheid, and the crimes and violations committed by the liberation movements.

If you had a permanent structure, I do not think it would have any practical significance. I think it would be a waste of money.

Tribunal: What would you see as the end of mission for ICTY in case it does not naturally grow into a permanent war-crimes court?

RG: It could be the end, until the movement is resuscitated. It will happen one day, I've got no doubt. One day we will have a permanent international criminal court, because without it, modern technology is putting so much [destructive power] into the hands of criminals, be they heads of states or juntas. It will have to happen. To the extent that if [the June meeting in] Rome fails and there is no quick agreement on the permanent international court, I think it [would be] the end of ad hoc courts unless there is some terrible catastrophe that leaves international community with no option. I think that it was a strange window that opened in May 1993 with the end of Cold War there was a huge [upsurge] of feeling, mainly as a result of CNN and newspaper reporting on ethnic cleansing. That enabled a unanimous Security Council decision on setting up a war crimes tribunal. ... I think it would be very difficult ... to get no veto in the Security Council today.